This paper investigates whether personal tax could help explain the size of the historic equity premium in the UK measured before personal tax. If there has been a higher tax burden on equity, some of the premium could be viewed as compensation for tax. We estimate that personal tax reduces the arithmetic mean nominal return on equity from 13.3% to 11.1% pa during 1919-98, and the mean return on gilts from 7.1% to 5.6% pa. Thus, personal tax accounts for a slightly higher proportion of the before-tax return on gilts than on equity, implying that the equity premium is not a compensation for a higher tax burden on equity.
Introduction
Returns on equity and government bonds are normally measured before personal tax.
The familiar sources of annual returns data are Barclays Capital's Equity-Gilt Study for the UK and Ibbotson Associates' Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Yearbook for the US, both published annually. Alternative estimates of returns in ten countries since 1900 have recently appeared in Dimson, Marsh & Staunton's Millenium Book (2000) . All these studies calculate returns before personal tax: they ignore income tax on dividends and interest, and they ignore capital gains tax. This paper provides, for the first time, estimates of returns on UK equity and gilts after personal tax. The period covered is the 80 years 1919-98.
The main reason why returns have been measured before personal tax is probably that investors have different tax circumstances. This means that a market return after tax has to be estimated as an average across investors: it can not be observed. But an estimate of the return after tax is of interest, because personal tax is one factor which might have affected the size of the historic equity premium. A historic premium is the difference between average returns on equity and average returns on a default-free asset measured over a certain time interval, usually several decades. The historic premium has attracted much attention in recent years; it is larger than can easily be explained by theory, and many observers do not believe that the premium in the future will be as large as it has been in the past, at least in the UK and USA (see Freeman and Davidson, 1999, or Cornell, 1999 , for a recent review). There appears to have been no empirical study of the impact of personal tax. It is possible that returns on equity have been taxed more heavily than returns on gilts, in which case some of the premium measured before tax could be viewed as compensation for the higher tax burden on equity, not as compensation for bearing risk.
The next section comments briefly on the use of a historic premium before and after tax in estimating the cost of equity. Sections 3 and 4 explain, respectively, how ownership weights and effective personal tax rates are arrived at for the different categories of investor by tax status. Section 5 describes the calculation of returns after tax and presents the results.
Section 6 concludes. Throughout the paper, before or after tax means before or after personal tax.
Use of a historic premium
The historic or ex post premium, or excess return, is an important number because it is often used as a proxy for the ex ante premium in estimating the cost of equity, as is recommended in leading textbooks (for example, Brealey & Myers, 2000, pp. 153-60; Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, 1997, p. 279) . The underlying principle is simply that the premium observed over a sufficiently long period is an adequate proxy for the premium investors expected in the past, and that investors continue to expect a similar premium in the future.
The principle can be questioned. For example, one may believe that the historic premium has turned out to be larger than was expected, and that it is therefore not a good proxy for the ex ante premium. But there would still remain the question of why the historic premium is so large.
One issue which arises is whether to calculate a historic premium from returns measured before or after tax. If there were no restrictions or costs of investing in different assets, in equilibrium all assets would have the same expected risk-adjusted return after personal tax, and all investors would face the same tax rate, otherwise there would be pure or quasi arbitrage opportunities (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992, especially chs. 5 and 6) . To illustrate, suppose Bonds A and B are default-free one year zero coupon bonds, with the gain on A taxed at 50% and on B at 0%. The potential for pure arbitrage ensures that the bonds must return the same after tax, say 5%, which means that the returns measured before tax are 10% for Bond A and 5% for Bond B. If either or both of the bonds were risky, the gain from a tax-arbitrage trade would not be certain, so such a trade would be quasi arbitrage. But we would expect both bonds to have the same risk-adjusted return after tax, that is, the same return after deducting their respective risk premia after tax.
In a frictionless market such as this, a historic premium measured before tax could obviously be a misleading guide to the premium investors require for taking risk. If the tax rates on two assets differed, some of the observed return before tax on the more heavily taxed asset would be compensation for the higher tax rate. For example, the actual arithmetic mean returns before tax during 1919-98 were 13.3% pa on equity and 7.1% pa on gilts, so the historic equity premium was 6.2% pa. Suppose effective personal tax rates during this period were, say, 40% on equity and 20% on gilts (with no frictions, all investors would have paid the same rate of tax on an asset). Then the historic returns on equity and gilts measured after tax would have been 8.0% pa and 5.7% pa respectively, and investors would have received a premium of 2.3% pa after tax. Had equity been taxed at the same rate as gilts, 20%, the return before tax need only have been 8%/0.8 = 10.0% pa to have provided an after-tax premium of 2.3% pa (2.9% x 0.8). So more than half (3.3%/6.2%) of the historic premium measured before tax would have been attributable to the higher personal tax rate on equity, and not to the reward required for taking equity risk. 1 But more than one personal tax rate on an asset exists in practice, because individuals and investment vehicles face differing tax rates and there are restrictions and costs of switching across individuals and investment vehicles. An example of a restriction is the limit on how much an individual can invest in a tax-exempt pension fund. An example of costs is the difficulties individuals face in reaching reliable agreements between themselves to exploit opportunities to reduce tax (such agreements would anyway be restricted if they became widespread). This situation means that an asset's observed return after tax varies across investors, that the effect of tax on an asset's price is uncertain, and that it is problematic to infer risk premia from observed returns measured either before or after tax.
Returning to the two risk-free bonds described above, suppose now that there are two categories of investor, High Tax and Low Tax. High Tax investors face a 50% tax rate on Bond A's return, Low Tax investors face a 25% rate. We can no longer say ex ante what the return on Bond A will be before or after tax. For there to be equilibrium prices for the two bonds, investors must face restrictions or costs which limit feasible tax arbitrage, or they must face progressive tax rates such that some marginal tax rates across investors exist at which arbitrage gain is not possible (Dammon & Green, 1987) . Since both bonds are risk-free, the risk premium investors require between them is
zero. Yet the interplay between taxes and costs of switching can produce a difference in the returns measured before and after tax. The returns before tax are 8% for Bond A and 5% for Bond B. The return on Bond A after tax depends on the tax rate assumed or estimated, which would lie in the range 25% to 50%. There is no guarantee that the return after tax on Bond A would equal the 5% on the tax-exempt bond. Thus, in markets with frictions and with investors taxed at different rates, a premium calculated from returns measured either before or after tax provides an unreliable guide to the risk premium required by investors collectively.
The point for our purposes is that an after-tax measure provides at least as good a guide. With no frictions, it would clearly be wrong to use the before-tax measure. If there are frictions, there will not be a single market-wide personal tax rate on each asset, and asset prices will be affected by the taxes and frictions in what may be a complex way. But we would expect the asset on which more tax is paid in aggregate per unit of return to have a higher observed rate of return measured before tax than a less heavily taxed asset. The well-known difference in yield between taxable and tax-exempt US bonds of the same risk supports this idea.
The single tax rate on an asset class estimated in the current paper is an effective rate defined as (R gross -R net )/R gross , where R gross is the total return to all investors before personal tax, and R net is the return after subtracting the total amount of personal tax paid. We follow the method of previous studies 2 which have estimated an effective personal tax rate by calculating a weighted average of the tax rates faced by owners of the asset, with the weights given by the proportions held by each category of owner in the relevant year.
Ownership of equity and gilts by category of investor
For the purpose of calculating tax rates on dividend income, we allocate holdings of equity to one of three categories of investor: individuals, including unit trusts; life assurance funds; and tax-exempt investors, including self-administered pension funds, insured pension (Revell, 1973 (Revell, , p. 473), 1976 onwards (Carter & Godden, 1983 and later editions) and 1988 onwards (Financial Statistics).
According to these sources, the relative importance of general insurance funds peaked in the mid-1970s. They accounted for 9% of shares and 12% of gilts held by all insurance companies in 1957, 23% of shares and 18% of gilts in 1976, and 4% of shares and 11% of gilts in 1998.
We assume a 10% general/90% life split for shares and gilts before 1957. The proportion of life assurance assets represented by pension fund assets has been estimated at 24% in 1978 (Wilson Report, 1980 , pp. 532 and 579) and 15% in 1993 (Share Register Survey, 1993 10). The investment income of insured pension funds was exempted from tax in 1956, and by then life offices were transacting a substantial amount of pension business (Fisher & Young, 1965, pp. 68-75) . We include insured pension funds in life funds for the years before 1956, and we assume that pension fund assets were 24% of total life assurance assets throughout 1956-78. By using these estimates and interpolating figures for 'missing' years, we break down the single figure for shares or gilts held by insurance companies, first by separating out general insurance assets and adding them to holdings of other UK companies, then by dividing life assurance assets between life and pension funds, and adding pension assets to the tax-exempt category from 1956 onwards. 4
Our estimates of the proportions of equity and gilts owned by category of investor, after making all the above adjustments, are shown at ten-yearly intervals in Table 1 . These proportions have been derived to enable weighted average personal tax rates to be calculated: they do not provide a full picture of asset ownership and changes therein. For both equity and gilts, direct ownership by individuals has fallen steadily since the 1940s, whilst ownership by life funds and tax-exempt investors, mainly pension funds, has increased. Table 1 around here
Personal tax rates by category of investor

Individuals
Individuals have faced a progressive income tax schedule, with dividend and interest income taxed in a similar way to income from employment. 5 We update the effective tax rate estimates of Orhnial & Foldes (1975) and King (1977) , following them in treating investment income as marginal income, and so subject to the highest rate of tax paid by the individual concerned. The method used is explained in the Appendix and the rates for each year are shown in Table 2 . The estimated effective tax rates for individuals on both dividends and interest are the same until 1973, when separate data become available for dividend and interest income received by individuals in differing tax bands, resulting in slightly different estimates of the tax rate on dividends and interest for the individuals category from 1973. The effective rate paid by individuals was 30-40% in the interwar years and rose sharply to above 60% during most of the 1940s. It remained around 60% until the mid-1970s, and has since declined steadily to 30% by the mid-1990s (the individuals category excludes holdings under personal equity plans, which were exempt). Revell (1973, p. 434) estimates that single premiums were 10% to 15% of total premiums in the mid-1960s and the proportion was 20% in 1981 (Carter & Godden, 1983) . We have assumed that 80% of total premiums were for qualifying policies during 1968-83, falling by eight percentage points per annum from 1984, so that by 1994 LAPR disappears from the calculations altogether.
The arrangements outlined above resulted in very small or negative effective tax rates on life fund investment income until the late 1980s (shown in Table 2 ). LAPR meant that £1 of premium was worth £1/(1 -λ), where λ is the value of the relief as a percentage of the gross premium. Combining the grossing-up effect of LAPR with the tax rate on investment income at the level of the life office, T life (1 -P pen -0.5), gives the formula for the effective tax rate on life fund investment income, T E . In 1980, for example, the formula is
where q is the proportion of premiums paid for qualifying policies. For 1980 our estimate for q is 0.8, the tax rate on unrelieved investment income (T life ) is 37.5%, our estimate for the proportion of pension assets (P pen ) is 22.5%, and λ is 0.175. The resulting value for T E is -4.9%. The reason for the negative rate is that the benefit of LAPR exceeds the estimated tax rate on investment income for the life fund. Our treatment of the taxation of income received by life funds is materially different from that of Orhnial & Foldes (1975) and King (1977) .
They adjust for LAPR but assume that all life office investment income was taxed at 37.5% (from 1940), which ignores the I-E system. So their estimates of the effective tax rates for life fund investment income are much higher than ours.
Tax-exempt investors
The tax rate for this category is 0% until 1997. All tax-exempt investors could reclaim income tax deducted at source until July 1997, when the law was changed for pension funds.
Our treatment of this change is explained in Section 5.2.
The investment income of self-administered pension funds was exempted from tax in 1921, and the income of insured funds was exempted in 1956 (very little tax had been paid on it before then -see note 7). Most of the payments to the policyholder have been taxed as income when received, but pension contributions within prescribed limits have attracted relief from tax at the contributing employer's or employee's marginal rate. In line with previous studies, we take the view that taxation of payments 'cancels out' the initial relief on contributions (and we ignore the relief obtained on some charitable donations). 8 onwards. 9 The CGT on listed shares has been 33% of total CGT on average since 1985, and we assume this proportion holds for the years before 1985. To arrive at estimates of annualised effective CGT rates, we first calculate the aggregate annual capital gain or loss on listed shares on the simple assumption that investors hold shares for various fixed intervals ranging from one to ten years. The gain or loss for year t assuming a one year holding period is ∆C 1t = V t-1 (I t -I t-1 )/I t-1 , where V t is the market value of the FT-Actuaries All Share Index at the end of year t and I t is the level of the Index. The gain or loss assuming, say, a five year holding period is ∆C 5t = [V t-5 (I t -I t-5 )/I t-5 ]/5. Shareholders sell one fifth of their shares each
Capital gains tax and stamp duty
year, so the annual realised gain or loss is one fifth of the accumulated gain or loss over five years.
The second step is to deduct the actual CGT paid from the gain or loss for the year.
The returns for the year after CGT for the one and five year holding periods are, respectively, Table 3 shows the arithmetic mean annual returns from changes in market value during 1969-98 before and after CGT for holding periods of one, three, five and ten years (CGT payments were tiny during 1965-68). Changes in market value in Table 3 are measured over tax years, which start on 6 April. The difference due to CGT is 0.17% pa for the one year holding period, 0.28% pa for the five year period and 0.50% pa for the ten year period. Survey evidence indicates that the average holding period for institutional investors is five years (Marsh, 1990, p. 40 ), so we assume the effective CGT rate is 0.3% pa starting in 1969. We ignore CGT on gilts, partly because most of the return comes from interest, partly because gilts held for more than one year were exempt during 1968-85, and all gilts were exempt during 1986-95. as for CGT, that investors turn over one fifth of their shareholdings each year, so the effective rate of stamp duty is one fifth of the rate prevailing for the year.
Returns after personal tax
Calculation of returns after tax
Our source for annual returns on equity and gilts before tax is the Equity-Gilt Study (2000) . The Study has been published annually since 1956 and is widely referred to in the UK.
Returns on gilts are calculated using undated gilts before 1962, and gilts with an average term -1 = 18.1%. For simplicity and clarity, we ignore the difference between the calendar year and the tax year, so the tax rates applicable to dividend and interest income in each year are those in force from 6 April.
Returns after tax and changes in the tax system
The Study returns are calculated as though all investors were tax-exempt, except for 1998. This is true whether a classical or an imputation tax system was in force. Under a classical system, companies pay corporation tax on profit, and dividends are treated as untaxed income at the shareholder level. The personal tax rate for an exempt investor, for example, is 0%. Under an imputation system, some or all of the corporation tax also counts as income tax. Consider the version of the imputation system in force during 1973-96.
Companies paid advance corporation tax (ACT) on dividends, which was part of corporation tax and provided a tax credit to set against the shareholder's income tax liability. Shareholders exempt from tax could reclaim from the Inland Revenue the ACT paid by the company. The dividend yields recorded in the Study are gross of ACT, which assumes that all ACT was reclaimed, or in other words that all investors were tax-exempt. Therefore, the tax rate to apply to dividends as they appear in the Study is 0% for an exempt investor under both a classical and an imputation system, and the calculation of after-tax returns described in Section 5.1 is the same whichever system was in force. This is not to deny that the burden of tax on profits distributed as dividends is reduced under an imputation compared with a classical system. The benefit in the Study is reflected in higher equity values, and probably larger dividend payments, than would otherwise have been the case, and therefore higher returns on the index in some years.
A numerical example may be helpful. Suppose a company has profit before tax of £100m and pays gross dividends of £50m. The corporation tax rate is 40% and the income tax rate is 30%. Assume all shareholders pay this 30% rate. If the classical system were in force,
the Study would record gross dividends of £50m, and income tax of £15m would not be subtracted. The cash outflow from the company would be £90m, £40m corporation tax plus £50m gross dividends. Now suppose instead that an imputation system were in force, under which corporation tax also counts as income tax. The Study would still record gross dividends of £50m, so income tax not subtracted would still be £15m. But the cash outflow from the company would now be £75m, £40m in corporation tax, including £15m which also counts as income tax, and £35m in net dividends. Under either system the dividends after tax are £35m, but the total tax is £15m less under the imputation system. When the switch to imputation is announced, the market value of the company should rise by the present value of the expected future tax savings. 10
Our treatment might appear to be inconsistent with studies, such as Poterba & Summers (1984) and Morgan & Thomas (1998) , which note that the effective rate of tax on UK dividends fell sharply with the re-introduction of imputation in 1973, and became negative a few years later. Such studies reckon the effective rate of tax on dividends received by tax-exempt investors to be negative when an imputation system is in force, not 0%, because payment of dividends to tax-exempt shareholders reduces the combined corporation and personal tax take. But they are concerned with the taxation of dividends in comparison with retained profits. Our purpose is different, which is to estimate returns after tax given the way returns are already measured in the Study.
The most recent major change in the tax system took effect on 2 July 1997. From this date, pension funds could no longer reclaim ACT on dividend income, and the Study records the dividend yield net of ACT for 1998 onwards. Pension funds accounted for most of the taxexempt category by 1997, so to accommodate this change we change the tax rate for taxexempt investors from 0% to 20% for 1997 and 1998, and gross up the 1998 yield given in the Study by the ACT rate (20%). ACT still counted as income tax for individuals and life funds in 1998, so the tax rates for these categories continue to be applied to gross dividend income.
Results
Our estimates of the annual weighted average personal tax rates on gross dividend and gilts interest are shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 . Tax rates were at their highest during the war years of the 1940s, at around 64% for dividends and 42% for gilts. They have since tended to fall, and by the mid-1990s they were only about 11% for dividends and 10% for gilts. In 1997, however, the effective tax rate on dividends jumped to 21%, because of the abolition of ACT reclaim by pension funds. The reasons for the long decline in the effective tax burden until then are the growth of ownership by pension and life funds, and the reduction in tax rates for individuals since the mid-1970s. Figure 1 and Table 4 around here  Table 4 reports arithmetic and geometric mean nominal and real returns, and risk premia, before and after personal tax, for the full 80 years and for the 50 years 1949-98.
Geometric means are calculated assuming re-investment of dividends and interest. The equity premium measured after tax for the full period is 5.5% pa (nominal) or 5.0% pa (real) using arithmetic means, and 4.0% pa (nominal) or 3.8% pa (real) using geometric means. These premia are 0.7 percentage points smaller than the corresponding premia measured before tax, but this is entirely a consequence of measuring returns net rather than gross. The tax burden was, in fact, greater for gilts than for equity during 1919-98 and 1949-98. The arithmetic mean return on equity for 1919-98 is 13.3% pa before and 11.1% pa after tax, so personal tax reduces the mean return by 17%. The mean return on gilts is 7.1% pa before and 5.6% pa after tax, so personal tax reduces the return on gilts by 21%. The effect of tax is similar using geometric means; the mean return on equity is reduced by 20% and on gilts by 24%. The difference in impact is greater using real returns; personal tax reduces the arithmetic mean real return on equity by 23% and on gilts by 41%. The reason is that tax rates apply to nominal income, and with positive inflation, which occurred in 65 of the 80 years in the sample, a given tax rate is a larger percentage of the real return than of the nominal return. So any difference in the impact of tax on nominal returns will be amplified with real returns.
The reason for the larger impact of tax on gilts is that much of the return on equity has come from capital gain, which has largely been untaxed, whereas almost all of the return on gilts has been from taxable interest. The arithmetic mean nominal capital gain on equity is 8.2% pa and the mean return via gross dividends is 5.1% pa during 1919-98; the mean gain on gilts is 0.4% pa and the return via interest is 6.7% pa.
The assumption that investment income received by individuals is marginal income (Section 4.1), together with the possibilities for tax clienteles and tax avoidance, arguably means that we overstate the proportion of investment income paid as tax by individuals. In addition, data limitations mean that the estimates depend to an extent on somewhat arbitrary decisions about the proportions of dividends and interest received by individuals in different tax bands (Appendix). As a check on the robustness of our results, the calculations are reworked using the assumption that individuals simply paid income tax on dividends and interest at the standard rate, or basic rate from 1973. The arithmetic mean nominal return after tax during 1919-98 is 11.7% pa on equity, 0.6 percentage points higher, and 6.1% pa on gilts, 0.5 points higher. So the after-tax premium is almost identical to the premium of 5.5% reported in Table 4 , and the finding that the personal tax burden is slightly heavier on gilts is unaffected.
The results imply that high personal tax on equity is not an explanation for the size of the historic premium measured before tax. However, tax rates have not stayed constant, and it could be that changes in tax had the effect of inflating the before-tax premium. If the tax rate on an asset's returns falls unexpectedly, the market price should rise. Furthermore, the impact on price should be greater for equity than for gilts, because shares have a longer lifetime (at least after 1962, when undated gilts ceased to be used in the gilts index). Although returns measured before tax should be lower after a fall in the tax rate than they would have been had there been no fall, the return in the year the fall is announced may be much higher, due to capital gain. Effective tax rates on dividends and interest have moved roughly in parallel ( Figure 1) , but during the long, gradual fall in rates from 1948 to 1996, the effective rate on dividends fell by more than the rate on gilts, and the equity premium was relatively high (9.3% pa) during this period. On the other hand, there is no sign that the premium was high in years when there was a relatively large fall in the tax rate on dividends. We re-calculate the average returns during 1919-98 excluding each year in which there was a fall in the effective tax rate on dividends of three percentage points or more, together with the preceding year in case the fall was anticipated; 18 years altogether are excluded. The resulting arithmetic mean nominal returns are 14.4% pa on equity and 7.2% pa on gilts, so the premium before tax is 7.2% pa, larger than the premium before tax of 6.2% pa for the full 80 years. However, it must remain a possibility that the substantial fall in the effective tax rate on dividends during 1948-96 explains some of the good performance of equity in this period.
Conclusion
Historic returns on equity and gilts measured before personal tax have been available for many years and are widely used. There have been no estimates of returns after tax, perhaps because investors face differing personal tax rates and obtain differing returns after tax on the same asset, so that estimation of a market return after tax involves averaging across categories of investor by tax status. This paper has updated and revised existing estimates of weighted average personal tax rates on dividends and interest, and has provided estimates of effective rates of capital gains tax and stamp duty on equity. It has applied these rates to the nominal returns before tax inferred from Barclays Capital's Equity-Gilt Study (2000) to obtain returns after tax.
We use the returns after tax to estimate equity premia after tax and to investigate whether some of the premium measured before tax might have arisen because of higher personal tax on equity. For the 80 years 1919-98, the premium calculated using arithmetic mean nominal returns measured after personal tax is 5.5% pa, compared with a premium of 6.2% pa using before-tax returns. Though the after-tax premium is smaller, this is entirely because it has been calculated using net returns. The tax burden has been slightly heavier on gilts than on equity; personal tax reduces the mean arithmetic nominal return on equity by 17%, and on gilts by 21%. Using real returns, the reductions due to personal tax are 23% for equity and 41% for gilts. From 1948 to 1996, tax rates fell on both equity and gilts, but more so on equity, so it is possible that the falling tax burden was a reason for the capital gains on equity during this period. This would be worth investigating further. However, a simple comparison of the tax burdens on equity and gilts does not suggest that personal tax is an explanation for the size of the historic premium. The premium does not appear to be a compensation for a higher tax burden on equity.
Notes
1.
This analysis assumes that the after-tax required premium is invariant with respect to tax rates. It could be argued that the after-tax premium will be negatively related to tax rates.
Suppose we believe that, for a given expected rate of return on equity after all tax, a higher personal tax rate on equity implies a higher cost of capital (hurdle rate for new projects). Then a higher tax would imply less corporate investment and reduced demand for equity. If the supply of equity finance is less than perfectly elastic with respect to the after-tax expected rate of return, the equilibrium with the 40% tax on equity would feature a lower return on equity after tax and thus a smaller after-tax premium than would the equilibrium with the 20% tax on equity. This line of thought reinforces the argument that, with a higher tax rate on equity than on gilts, some of the premium measured before tax will be attributable to the difference in tax rates.
2.
Including Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux & Poterba (1983) , King (1977) , King & Fullerton (1984) , Orhnial & Foldes (1975) and Poterba & Summers (1984) .
3.
Holdings of individuals and private trusts were part of what was a large 'other' category in the Bank of England data, until individuals were distinguished in 1963 and private trusts in 1970. We assign all the 'other' holdings to individuals until 1970, from which date 'other' is ignored.
4.
Our assumptions differ in some respects from those of Orhnial & Foldes (1975) and King (1977) . They treat all insurance company assets as life assurance assets, and they assume that investment trusts are 100% owned by individuals, whereas we treat investment trusts as 'other UK shareholders' because since the 1950s a large proportion of investment trust shares has been owned by investing institutions (Newlands, 1997, p. 273) . For gilts, Orhnial & Foldes treat all official holdings as tax-exempt, whereas we assign half to individuals and half to tax-exempt; they assign all banking sector holdings to individuals, whereas we assign 60% to individuals and 40% to tax-exempt; they assign all company holdings to individuals, whereas treat them as a separate category; and they treat all overseas holders as tax-exempt, whereas we treat overseas public sector holders as exempt and ignore overseas private sector holders.
5.
There have been some differences. There was a surcharge on investment income during 1973-82. The basic rate of income tax was 20% on dividends from 1993 and 20% on gilts interest from 1996, slightly lower than the basic rate on income from employment. The income of discretionary trusts is taxed at a special rate, but we ignore this as we have no information on assets owned by discretionary trusts.
6. This is a simplification in various respects, the most noteworthy being that we do not distinguish general annuity business. We have no data on the proportion of assets represented 
for taxable income and
for total income, using the data in IRS each year. Once the coefficients have been estimated, each of the statutory taxable income thresholds is inserted into (1) to estimate the number of taxpayers N with taxable income in excess of the threshold. This N is inserted into (2) to find the total income threshold which corresponds with each taxable income threshold.
The next step is to read off the amount of investment income received by the individuals in each total income band corresponding with a taxable income band. Table A1 shows the data for 1970 as an example. Investment income received by individuals with taxable income of less than £2,500 in 1970, corresponding with an estimated total income of less than £4,104, is assumed to be taxed at the standard rate of income tax (41.25%). It can be seen that the estimated total income bands, corresponding with taxable income bands, do not match the total income bands in the IRS table giving investment income. This means there is some subjectivity in the final weightings assigned to each tax rate. Most awkward is how to allocate the £289m of investment income received by individuals with a total income of £10,000 or more between the four bands of taxable income applicable to such individuals. We assume that half of the £289m was received by individuals with taxable income of £15,000 or more, who paid the highest rate, and a sixth each by those who paid the next three rates down. Table A1 around here The above method was used by Orhnial and Foldes (1975) to estimate annual personal sector tax rates on dividends and gilt interest for 1919-69 and by King (1977) to estimate annual tax rates on dividends for 1947-71. The present study continues the series using the method from 1970 onwards, with modifications in some years. The main problem before 1988 is that, as for 1970, much of the dividend and interest income can not be allocated accurately between the higher taxable income bands, because the thresholds correspond with total incomes exceeding the maximum total income threshold in the table giving the breakdown of investment income. The assumption of a log-linear relationship between income levels and numbers of individuals gives implausible results for 1985 onwards, so we estimate the total income corresponding with a given taxable income as the taxable income plus twice the single person's tax-free allowance. The number of income tax rates was cut from seven to three (including zero) in 1988, making the effective tax rates for 1988-98 much easier to estimate. 
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